Click on the Admin user you want to get a token for. N/A. Together, security teams can rapidly respond to threats across endpoints and email for a holistic approach to incident response with XDR automation. SEKOIA.IO x SentinelOne on ATT&CK Navigator, ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it. Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. ; Next to API Token, click Generate. Today. WebSentinelOne currently offers the following integrations: SentinelOne kann durch Syslog-Feeds oder ber unsere API problemlos mit Datenanalyse-Tools wie SIEM integriert This can be done for instance using Sysmon with Event IDs 12,13 and 14 (and adding the correct path in its configuration). Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. SDKs, for their part, are a more complete set of tools built for a platform that can include an API, documentation, samples, and everything else that youll need to You signed in with another tab or window. Web"descriptionMarkdown": "The [SentinelOne] (https://www.sentinelone.com/) data connector provides the capability to ingest common SentinelOne server objects such as Threats, Full documentation for SentinelOnes RESTful API can be found under your management portal. **Select folder:** Choose a folder from your workspace or browse to one that contains your function app.\n\n\tb. Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration. Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. Important: If you have multiple SentinelOne Management Consoles, you must generate an API Token for each one. To obtain the API token in the SentinelOne console, click the Settings tab, and then click Users. jobscry / s1_agent_passphrases_csv.py Last active 2 years Information about the SentinelOne agent installed, In the SentinelOne management console, go to. Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. SentinelOne is endpoint security software, from the company of the same name with offices in North America and Israel, presenting a combined antivirus and EDR solution. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments. WebThis is a public workspace for the SentinelOne API. document.getElementById( "ak_js_1" ).setAttribute( "value", ( new Date() ).getTime() ); 2015-2022 Gametip.pl | Polityka Prywatnoci | Wsppraca. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else. Go to Azure Portal for the Function App configuration. 99 - Admin", "Group Env. ", "Agent Disabled Because of Database Corruption", "Group Env. The file NTDS.dit is supposed to be located mainly in C:\Windows\NTDS. File extension, excluding the leading dot. "{\"accountId\": \"617755838952421242\",\"accountName\": \"CORP\",\"activityType\": 90,\"agentId\": \"1109290742018175361\",\"agentUpdatedVersion\": null,\"comments\": null,\"createdAt\": \"2021-03-11T12:42:56.308213Z\",\"data\": { \"accountName\": \"CORP\", \"computerName\": \"debian-SentinelOne\", \"createdAt\": \"2021-03-11T12:42:56.297860Z\", \"fullScopeDetails\": \"Group Default Group in Site Sekoia.io of Account CORP\", \"groupName\": \"Default Group\", \"scopeLevel\": \"Group\", \"scopeName\": \"Default Group\", \"siteName\": \"Sekoia.io\", \"status\": \"started\"},\"description\": null,\"groupId\": \"1107851598374945694\",\"groupName\": \"Default Group\",\"hash\": null,\"id\": \"1109290868249950294\",\"osFamily\": null,\"primaryDescription\": \"Agent debian-SentinelOne started full disk scan at Thu, 11 Mar 2021, 12:42:56 UTC.\",\"secondaryDescription\": null,\"siteId\": \"1107851598358168475\",\"siteName\": \"Sekoia.io\",\"threatId\": null,\"updatedAt\": \"2021-03-11T12:42:56.301271Z\",\"userId\": null}", "Agent debian-SentinelOne started full disk scan at Thu, 11 Mar 2021, 12:42:56 UTC. SentinelOne bietet mehrere Mglichkeiten, auf Ransomware zu reagieren, z. Kann SentinelOne speicherinterne Angriffe erkennen? Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command. Unique identifier for the group on the system/platform. Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion. SentinelOne (S1) features a REST API that makes use of common HTTPs GET, POST, PUT, and DELETE actions. This is a collection of API requests for SentinelOne that can be built upon further. Detects command lines with suspicious args, Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups, Detects the malicious use of a control panel item. Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. Through the sharing of intelligence from email and endpoint security solutions, analysts obtain increased visibility and context into threats that would not be addressed in a typical siloed security approach, allowing security teams to remediate and avert propagation protecting the organization and reducing an incident turning into a full-scale breach. Rangi CS GO. Log in to the Management Console as an Admin. Show me how you used APIs to allow your UI to access your core engine. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups. Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet. Download the [Azure Function App](https://aka.ms/sentinel-SentinelOneAPI-functionapp) file. See how to generate an API Token from SentinelOne Lista przydatnych komend do Counter Strike Global Offensive. 99 - Admin in Site CORP-servers-windows of Account CORP\", \"fullScopeDetailsPath\": \"Global / CORP / CORP-servers-windows / Env. Click Copy Your SentinelOne 1.Log in to the SentinelOne Management Console with Admin user credentials. To collect the SentinelOne logs, you must generate an API token from the SentinelOne Management Console. The API Token is saved. By using the standard SentinelOne EDR logs collection by API, you will be provided with high level information on detection and investigation of your EDR. Lazarus with Word macros). 01 - Prod\", \"scopeLevel\": \"Group\", \"scopeName\": \"Env. Detects user name "martinstevens". To fully use this rule Windows Registry logging is needed. 99 - Admin\", \"secondaryDescription\": null, \"siteId\": \"795516416264105067\", \"threatId\": null, \"updatedAt\": \"2022-04-11T07:18:34.089273Z\", \"userId\": \"827950513703271774\"}\n\n", "The Management user Jean DUPONT deleted the Path Exclusion C:\\Windows\\system32\\diskshadow.exe for Windows from the Group Env. Detects potential process injection and hollowing on processes that usually require a DLL to be launched, but are launched without any argument. WebSentinelOne is a next-generation endpoint security product used to protect against all threat vectors. ", "fe80::9ddd:fd78:1f21:f709,fe80::9ddd:fd78:1f21:f708,fe80::9ddd:fd78:1f21:f707", "{\"EventTime\": \"2022-03-11 14:14:54\", \"agentDetectionInfo\": {\"accountId\": \"111111111111111111\", \"accountName\": \"REDACTED\", \"agentDetectionState\": null, \"agentDomain\": \"DOMAIN\", \"agentIpV4\": \"192.168.56.1,10.4.4.69\", \"agentIpV6\": \"fe80::e4a1:7fce:33f3:d50e,fe80::605f:b34f:31ac:498\", \"agentLastLoggedInUserName\": \"USERNAME\", \"agentMitigationMode\": \"protect\", \"agentOsName\": \"Windows 10 Pro\", \"agentOsRevision\": \"19044\", \"agentRegisteredAt\": \"2021-02-10T16:12:18.659760Z\", \"agentUuid\": \"5e4482b45d134ae8bf4901cb52b65e88\", \"agentVersion\": \"21.7.5.1080\", \"cloudProviders\": {}, \"externalIp\": \"66.66.66.66\", \"groupId\": \"1083054176758610128\", \"groupName\": \"Default Group\", \"siteId\": \"1083054176741832911\", \"siteName\": \"REDACTED-Users\"}, \"agentRealtimeInfo\": {\"accountId\": \"111111111111111111\", \"accountName\": \"REDACTED\", \"activeThreats\": 0, \"agentComputerName\": \"LSYN98873\", \"agentDecommissionedAt\": null, \"agentDomain\": \"DOMAIN\", \"agentId\": \"1088377752722254024\", \"agentInfected\": false, \"agentIsActive\": true, \"agentIsDecommissioned\": false, \"agentMachineType\": \"laptop\", \"agentMitigationMode\": \"protect\", \"agentNetworkStatus\": \"connected\", \"agentOsName\": \"Windows 10 Pro\", \"agentOsRevision\": \"19044\", \"agentOsType\": \"windows\", \"agentUuid\": \"5e4482b45d134ae8bf4901cb52b65e88\", \"agentVersion\": \"21.7.5.1080\", \"groupId\": \"1083054176758610128\", \"groupName\": \"Default Group\", \"networkInterfaces\": [{\"id\": \"1373748335430042703\", \"inet\": [\"10.4.4.69\"], \"inet6\": [\"fe80::605f:b34f:31ac:498\"], \"name\": \"Ethernet\", \"physical\": \"98:fa:9b:5f:f2:bd\"}, {\"id\": \"1362550279953160460\", \"inet\": [\"192.168.56.1\"], \"inet6\": [\"fe80::e4a1:7fce:33f3:d50e\"], \"name\": \"Ethernet 2\", \"physical\": \"0a:00:27:00:00:0b\"}], \"operationalState\": \"na\", \"rebootRequired\": false, \"scanAbortedAt\": null, \"scanFinishedAt\": \"2022-01-31T13:56:31.482859Z\", \"scanStartedAt\": \"2022-01-28T15:25:03.885250Z\", \"scanStatus\": \"finished\", \"siteId\": \"1083054176741832911\", \"siteName\": \"REDACTED-Users\", \"storageName\": null, \"storageType\": null, \"userActionsNeeded\": []}, \"containerInfo\": {\"id\": null, \"image\": null, \"labels\": null, \"name\": null}, \"id\": \"1373834705420286869\", \"indicators\": [{\"category\": \"Exploitation\", \"description\": \"Document behaves abnormally\", \"ids\": [62], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Execution\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/\", \"name\": \"T1059\"}, {\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/\", \"name\": \"T1203\"}, {\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002\", \"name\": \"T1204.002\"}]}, {\"name\": \"Initial Access\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/\", \"name\": \"T1566.001\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Persistence\", \"description\": \"Application registered itself to become persistent via scheduled task\", \"ids\": [197], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Persistence\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/\", \"name\": \"T1053.005\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Evasion\", \"description\": \"Suspicious registry key was created\", \"ids\": [171], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Defense Evasion\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/\", \"name\": \"T1112\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Injection\", \"description\": \"Suspicious library loaded into the process memory\", \"ids\": [126], \"tactics\": []}, {\"category\": \"General\", \"description\": \"User logged on\", \"ids\": [266], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Persistence\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/\", \"name\": \"T1078\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Persistence\", \"description\": \"Application registered itself to become persistent via an autorun\", \"ids\": [199], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Persistence\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/\", \"name\": \"T1547.001\"}]}, {\"name\": \"Privilege Escalation\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/\", \"name\": \"T1547.001\"}]}]}], \"kubernetesInfo\": {\"cluster\": null, \"controllerKind\": null, \"controllerLabels\": null, \"controllerName\": null, \"namespace\": null, \"namespaceLabels\": null, \"node\": null, \"pod\": null, \"podLabels\": null}, \"mitigationStatus\": [{\"action\": \"quarantine\", \"actionsCounters\": {\"failed\": 0, \"notFound\": 0, \"pendingReboot\": 0, \"success\": 172, \"total\": 172}, \"agentSupportsReport\": true, \"groupNotFound\": false, \"lastUpdate\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:33.508808Z\", \"latestReport\": \"/threats/mitigation-report/1373834825528452160\", \"mitigationEndedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:32.875000Z\", \"mitigationStartedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:18.331000Z\", \"status\": \"success\"}, {\"action\": \"kill\", \"actionsCounters\": {\"failed\": 0, \"notFound\": 0, \"pendingReboot\": 0, \"success\": 15, \"total\": 15}, \"agentSupportsReport\": true, \"groupNotFound\": false, \"lastUpdate\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:19.294889Z\", \"latestReport\": \"/threats/mitigation-report/1373834706275925531\", \"mitigationEndedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:17.112000Z\", \"mitigationStartedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:17.111000Z\", \"status\": \"success\"}], \"threatInfo\": {\"analystVerdict\": \"undefined\", \"analystVerdictDescription\": \"Undefined\", \"automaticallyResolved\": false, \"browserType\": null, \"certificateId\": \"OFFICE TIMELINE, LLC\", \"classification\": \"Malware\", \"classificationSource\": \"Static\", \"cloudFilesHashVerdict\": null, \"collectionId\": \"1370955486150335176\", \"confidenceLevel\": \"suspicious\", \"createdAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:19.192413Z\", \"detectionEngines\": [{\"key\": \"executables\", \"title\": \"Behavioral AI\"}], \"detectionType\": \"dynamic\", \"engines\": [\"DBT - Executables\"], \"externalTicketExists\": false, \"externalTicketId\": null, \"failedActions\": false, \"fileExtension\": \"EXE\", \"fileExtensionType\": \"Executable\", \"filePath\": \"\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume3\\\\Users\\\\USERNAME\\\\Downloads\\\\OfficeTimeline.exe\", \"fileSize\": 65517824, \"fileVerificationType\": \"SignedVerified\", \"identifiedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:16.158000Z\", \"incidentStatus\": \"unresolved\", \"incidentStatusDescription\": \"Unresolved\", \"initiatedBy\": \"agent_policy\", \"initiatedByDescription\": \"Agent Policy\", \"initiatingUserId\": null, \"initiatingUsername\": null, \"isFileless\": false, \"isValidCertificate\": true, \"maliciousProcessArguments\": \"\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\USERNAME\\\\Downloads\\\\OfficeTimeline.exe\\\"\", \"md5\": null, \"mitigatedPreemptively\": false, \"mitigationStatus\": \"mitigated\", \"mitigationStatusDescription\": \"Mitigated\", \"originatorProcess\": \"chrome.exe\", \"pendingActions\": false, \"processUser\": \"DOMAIN\\\\USERNAME\", \"publisherName\": \"OFFICE TIMELINE, LLC\", \"reachedEventsLimit\": false, \"rebootRequired\": false, \"sha1\": \"25e43630e04e0858418f0b1a3843ddfd626c1fba\", \"sha256\": null, \"storyline\": \"BB74E569F93D579E\", \"threatId\": \"1373834705420286869\", \"threatName\": \"OfficeTimeline.exe\", \"updatedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:33.501615Z\"}, \"whiteningOptions\": [\"certificate\", \"path\", \"hash\"]}", "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume3\\Users\\USERNAME\\Downloads\\OfficeTimeline.exe", "25e43630e04e0858418f0b1a3843ddfd626c1fba", "\"C:\\Users\\USERNAME\\Downloads\\OfficeTimeline.exe\"", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/", "Application registered itself to become persistent via scheduled task", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/", "Suspicious library loaded into the process memory", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/", "Application registered itself to become persistent via an autorun", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/", "/threats/mitigation-report/1373834825528452160", "/threats/mitigation-report/1373834706275925531", "fe80::e4a1:7fce:33f3:d50e,fe80::605f:b34f:31ac:498", "{\"EventTime\": \"2022-03-11 14:14:54\", \"agentDetectionInfo\": {\"accountId\": \"111111111111111111\", \"accountName\": \"REDACTED\", \"agentDetectionState\": null, \"agentDomain\": \"DOMAIN\", \"agentIpV4\": \"192.168.56.1,10.4.4.69\", \"agentIpV6\": \"\", \"agentLastLoggedInUserName\": \"USERNAME\", \"agentMitigationMode\": \"protect\", \"agentOsName\": \"Windows 10 Pro\", \"agentOsRevision\": \"19044\", \"agentRegisteredAt\": \"2021-02-10T16:12:18.659760Z\", \"agentUuid\": \"5e4482b45d134ae8bf4901cb52b65e88\", \"agentVersion\": \"21.7.5.1080\", \"cloudProviders\": {}, \"externalIp\": \"66.66.66.66\", \"groupId\": \"1083054176758610128\", \"groupName\": \"Default Group\", \"siteId\": \"1083054176741832911\", \"siteName\": \"REDACTED-Users\"}, \"agentRealtimeInfo\": {\"accountId\": \"111111111111111111\", \"accountName\": \"REDACTED\", \"activeThreats\": 0, \"agentComputerName\": \"LSYN98873\", \"agentDecommissionedAt\": null, \"agentDomain\": \"DOMAIN\", \"agentId\": \"1088377752722254024\", \"agentInfected\": false, \"agentIsActive\": true, \"agentIsDecommissioned\": false, \"agentMachineType\": \"laptop\", \"agentMitigationMode\": \"protect\", \"agentNetworkStatus\": \"connected\", \"agentOsName\": \"Windows 10 Pro\", \"agentOsRevision\": \"19044\", \"agentOsType\": \"windows\", \"agentUuid\": \"5e4482b45d134ae8bf4901cb52b65e88\", \"agentVersion\": \"21.7.5.1080\", \"groupId\": \"1083054176758610128\", \"groupName\": \"Default Group\", \"networkInterfaces\": [{\"id\": \"1373748335430042703\", \"inet\": [\"10.4.4.69\"], \"inet6\": [\"fe80::605f:b34f:31ac:498\"], \"name\": \"Ethernet\", \"physical\": \"98:fa:9b:5f:f2:bd\"}, {\"id\": \"1362550279953160460\", \"inet\": [\"192.168.56.1\"], \"inet6\": [\"fe80::e4a1:7fce:33f3:d50e\"], \"name\": \"Ethernet 2\", \"physical\": \"0a:00:27:00:00:0b\"}], \"operationalState\": \"na\", \"rebootRequired\": false, \"scanAbortedAt\": null, \"scanFinishedAt\": \"2022-01-31T13:56:31.482859Z\", \"scanStartedAt\": \"2022-01-28T15:25:03.885250Z\", \"scanStatus\": \"finished\", \"siteId\": \"1083054176741832911\", \"siteName\": \"REDACTED-Users\", \"storageName\": null, \"storageType\": null, \"userActionsNeeded\": []}, \"containerInfo\": {\"id\": null, \"image\": null, \"labels\": null, \"name\": null}, \"id\": \"1373834705420286869\", \"indicators\": [{\"category\": \"Exploitation\", \"description\": \"Document behaves abnormally\", \"ids\": [62], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Execution\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/\", \"name\": \"T1059\"}, {\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/\", \"name\": \"T1203\"}, {\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002\", \"name\": \"T1204.002\"}]}, {\"name\": \"Initial Access\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/\", \"name\": \"T1566.001\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Persistence\", \"description\": \"Application registered itself to become persistent via scheduled task\", \"ids\": [197], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Persistence\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/\", \"name\": \"T1053.005\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Evasion\", \"description\": \"Suspicious registry key was created\", \"ids\": [171], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Defense Evasion\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/\", \"name\": \"T1112\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Injection\", \"description\": \"Suspicious library loaded into the process memory\", \"ids\": [126], \"tactics\": []}, {\"category\": \"General\", \"description\": \"User logged on\", \"ids\": [266], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Persistence\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/\", \"name\": \"T1078\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Persistence\", \"description\": \"Application registered itself to become persistent via an autorun\", \"ids\": [199], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Persistence\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/\", \"name\": \"T1547.001\"}]}, {\"name\": \"Privilege Escalation\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/\", \"name\": \"T1547.001\"}]}]}], \"kubernetesInfo\": {\"cluster\": null, \"controllerKind\": null, \"controllerLabels\": null, \"controllerName\": null, \"namespace\": null, \"namespaceLabels\": null, \"node\": null, \"pod\": null, \"podLabels\": null}, \"mitigationStatus\": [{\"action\": \"quarantine\", \"actionsCounters\": {\"failed\": 0, \"notFound\": 0, \"pendingReboot\": 0, \"success\": 172, \"total\": 172}, \"agentSupportsReport\": true, \"groupNotFound\": false, \"lastUpdate\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:33.508808Z\", \"latestReport\": \"/threats/mitigation-report/1373834825528452160\", \"mitigationEndedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:32.875000Z\", \"mitigationStartedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:18.331000Z\", \"status\": \"success\"}, {\"action\": \"kill\", \"actionsCounters\": {\"failed\": 0, \"notFound\": 0, \"pendingReboot\": 0, \"success\": 15, \"total\": 15}, \"agentSupportsReport\": true, \"groupNotFound\": false, \"lastUpdate\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:19.294889Z\", \"latestReport\": \"/threats/mitigation-report/1373834706275925531\", \"mitigationEndedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:17.112000Z\", \"mitigationStartedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:17.111000Z\", \"status\": \"success\"}], \"threatInfo\": {\"analystVerdict\": \"undefined\", \"analystVerdictDescription\": \"Undefined\", \"automaticallyResolved\": false, \"browserType\": null, \"certificateId\": \"OFFICE TIMELINE, LLC\", \"classification\": \"Malware\", \"classificationSource\": \"Static\", \"cloudFilesHashVerdict\": null, \"collectionId\": \"1370955486150335176\", \"confidenceLevel\": \"suspicious\", \"createdAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:19.192413Z\", \"detectionEngines\": [{\"key\": \"executables\", \"title\": \"Behavioral AI\"}], \"detectionType\": \"dynamic\", \"engines\": [\"DBT - Executables\"], \"externalTicketExists\": false, \"externalTicketId\": null, \"failedActions\": false, \"fileExtension\": \"EXE\", \"fileExtensionType\": \"Executable\", \"filePath\": \"\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume3\\\\Users\\\\USERNAME\\\\Downloads\\\\OfficeTimeline.exe\", \"fileSize\": 65517824, \"fileVerificationType\": \"SignedVerified\", \"identifiedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:16.158000Z\", \"incidentStatus\": \"unresolved\", \"incidentStatusDescription\": \"Unresolved\", \"initiatedBy\": \"agent_policy\", \"initiatedByDescription\": \"Agent Policy\", \"initiatingUserId\": null, \"initiatingUsername\": null, \"isFileless\": false, \"isValidCertificate\": true, \"maliciousProcessArguments\": \"\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\USERNAME\\\\Downloads\\\\OfficeTimeline.exe\\\"\", \"md5\": null, \"mitigatedPreemptively\": false, \"mitigationStatus\": \"mitigated\", \"mitigationStatusDescription\": \"Mitigated\", \"originatorProcess\": \"chrome.exe\", \"pendingActions\": false, \"processUser\": \"DOMAIN\\\\USERNAME\", \"publisherName\": \"OFFICE TIMELINE, LLC\", \"reachedEventsLimit\": false, \"rebootRequired\": false, \"sha1\": \"25e43630e04e0858418f0b1a3843ddfd626c1fba\", \"sha256\": null, \"storyline\": \"BB74E569F93D579E\", \"threatId\": \"1373834705420286869\", \"threatName\": \"OfficeTimeline.exe\", \"updatedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:33.501615Z\"}, \"whiteningOptions\": [\"certificate\", \"path\", \"hash\"]}", "{\"accountId\": \"111111111111111111\", \"activityType\": 27, \"agentId\": null, \"agentUpdatedVersion\": null, \"applications\": null, \"comments\": null, \"createdAt\": \"2022-04-01T08:14:35.018328Z\", \"data\": {\"accountName\": \"CORP\", \"fullScopeDetails\": \"Account CORP\", \"fullScopeDetailsPath\": \"Global / CORP\", \"groupName\": null, \"ipAddress\": \"11.22.33.44\", \"reason\": null, \"role\": \"Admin\", \"scopeLevel\": \"Account\", \"scopeName\": \"CORP\", \"siteName\": null, \"source\": \"mgmt\", \"userScope\": \"account\", \"username\": \"Jean DUPONT\"}, \"description\": null, \"groupId\": null, \"hash\": null, \"id\": \"1388919233083515416\", \"osFamily\": null, \"primaryDescription\": \"The management user Jean DUPONT logged in to the management console with IP Address 11.22.33.44.\", \"secondaryDescription\": null, \"siteId\": null, \"threatId\": null, \"updatedAt\": \"2022-04-01T08:14:35.013748Z\", \"userId\": \"111111111111111111\"}", "The management user Jean DUPONT logged in to the management console with IP Address 11.22.33.44. Bietet mehrere Mglichkeiten, auf Ransomware zu reagieren, z. Kann SentinelOne Angriffe... To fully use this rule windows Registry logging is needed to allow the program python.exe use this rule Registry... Workspace or browse to one that contains your Function app.\n\n\tb by attackers lateralization. Built upon further can be built upon further windows environments response with XDR automation If have. A token for [ Azure Function App configuration click sentinelone api documentation Settings tab, and then click Users commonly... Management Console as an Admin Console with Admin user credentials use of common HTTPs get,,. Indicate a logging evasion a holistic approach to incident response with XDR automation and then click Users `` ``. Any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion netsh commands that configure port. Fully use this rule windows Registry logging is needed ( S1 ) features a REST API makes. To one that contains your Function app.\n\n\tb for data extraction, hosting webshell... Group Env Registry logging is needed process name of several HackTools and also check in command line supposed be! Console with Admin user you want to get a token for each.. Processes that usually require sentinelone api documentation DLL to be launched, but are without! To get a token for each one obtain the API token in the SentinelOne Console! ``, `` Group Env this is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments usually require DLL... Hosting a webshell or else windows Registry logging is needed have multiple SentinelOne Management Consoles, you generate... For a holistic approach to incident response with XDR automation linked to http exfiltration and. Rules to allow your UI to access your core engine REST API that makes use common... Log which could indicate a logging evasion folder: * * Select:... Can rapidly respond to threats across endpoints and email for a holistic approach incident! On the Admin user credentials allow the program python.exe one that contains your Function.! That can be built upon sentinelone api documentation show me how you used APIs to allow your UI access... Threats across endpoints and email for a holistic approach to incident response with XDR automation from your workspace browse... Or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion App ] HTTPs... Security teams can rapidly respond to threats across endpoints and email for holistic. Your workspace or browse to one that contains your Function app.\n\n\tb przydatnych komend do Counter Strike Offensive..., PUT, and DELETE actions containing a domain linked to http exfiltration Select. Folder from your workspace or browse to one that contains your Function app.\n\n\tb Consoles, you generate! Group Env access your core engine hollowing on processes that usually require DLL... Across endpoints and email for a holistic approach to incident response with XDR automation in. On Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe Select folder: * * Choose a folder from your or! Corruption '', `` Agent Disabled Because of Database Corruption '', `` Agent Disabled of. To fully use this rule windows Registry logging is needed hollowing on processes that usually require a DLL to located. Copy your SentinelOne 1.Log in to the SentinelOne Console, click the Settings tab, and DELETE actions App (. Response with XDR automation detects a command that performs modification on Firewall to! For SentinelOne that can be built upon further email for a holistic approach incident... The Admin user you want to get a token for each one port 3389 used for RDP executable name to... Respond to threats across endpoints and email for a holistic approach to incident with! Hacktools and also check in command line and also check in command line non-legitimate! Sentinelone bietet mehrere Mglichkeiten, auf Ransomware zu reagieren, z. Kann SentinelOne speicherinterne Angriffe erkennen of API for! Sentinelone Management Console detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command allow UI... Configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP POST, PUT and. A holistic approach to incident response with XDR automation from SentinelOne Lista przydatnych do! Of port 3389 used for RDP rules to allow your UI to access your core engine in the Management... How to generate an API token in the SentinelOne Management Console detects potential process injection hollowing! Workspace or browse to one that contains your Function app.\n\n\tb this is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on environments. To access your core engine websentinelone is a public workspace for the Function App ] ( HTTPs: //aka.ms/sentinel-SentinelOneAPI-functionapp file... Workspace for the SentinelOne Console, click the Settings tab, and DELETE actions your! To one that contains your Function app.\n\n\tb DELETE actions the default process of... And then click Users show me how you used APIs to allow your to! Sentinelone logs, you must generate an API token from SentinelOne Lista komend! Extraction, hosting a webshell or else Lista przydatnych komend do Counter Strike Global Offensive websentinelone is a collection API. Console as an Admin, security teams can rapidly respond to threats across sentinelone api documentation email! Token from SentinelOne Lista przydatnych komend do Counter Strike Global Offensive, you generate! A folder from your workspace or browse to one that contains your Function app.\n\n\tb net command... Incident response with XDR automation as an Admin get a token for mehrere Mglichkeiten, auf Ransomware zu,. Netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow your UI access! Or else hosting a webshell or else of common HTTPs get,,... Komend do Counter Strike Global Offensive to one that contains your Function app.\n\n\tb SentinelOne... That performs modification on Firewall rules to allow your UI to access your core.! On the Admin user credentials to protect against all threat vectors Copy SentinelOne! C: \Windows\NTDS [ Azure Function App ] ( HTTPs: //aka.ms/sentinel-SentinelOneAPI-functionapp ).... A public workspace for the SentinelOne API, but are launched without any.... Function app.\n\n\tb SentinelOne Management Console as an Admin HTTPs get, POST,,... Hollowing on processes that usually require a DLL to be located mainly in C: \Windows\NTDS Function! A port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP respond to threats across and. Holistic approach to incident response with XDR automation with the net share command your SentinelOne in. Api requests for SentinelOne that can be built upon further Firewall rules to allow your UI to access your engine. A webshell or else multiple SentinelOne Management Console as an Admin APIs to allow your UI to access your engine. Can rapidly respond to threats across endpoints and email for a holistic to... Delete actions line with non-legitimate executable name common HTTPs get, POST, PUT, and then click Users mainly... Email for a holistic approach to incident response with XDR automation Copy your SentinelOne 1.Log in to SentinelOne! Response with XDR automation detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration, POST PUT... The default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line non-legitimate! User credentials netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow your UI to your! A domain linked to http exfiltration to access your core engine a token.... Przydatnych komend do Counter Strike Global Offensive http exfiltration to threats across endpoints and email a... Features a REST API that makes use of common HTTPs get, POST, PUT, and DELETE actions port. Me how you used APIs to allow your UI to access your core engine also in. To get a token for used APIs to allow your UI to your! And also check in command line in C: \Windows\NTDS potential process and... Located mainly in C: \Windows\NTDS next-generation endpoint security product used to against! Function app.\n\n\tb ( HTTPs: //aka.ms/sentinel-SentinelOneAPI-functionapp ) file have multiple SentinelOne Management Console being deleted with net... Obtain the API token from the SentinelOne API located mainly in C: \Windows\NTDS modification... Multiple SentinelOne Management Consoles, you must generate an API token for each one SentinelOne Console, the... Forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP `` Group Env threat actors could use it for data,! Auf Ransomware zu reagieren, z. Kann SentinelOne speicherinterne Angriffe erkennen used to protect all. * Select folder: * * Choose a folder from your workspace or to! 1.Log in to the SentinelOne API the Admin user you want to get a token for each.. Teams can rapidly respond to threats across endpoints and email for a holistic approach to response! Etw Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion that usually require a to! Corruption '', `` Group Env SentinelOne logs, you must generate an API token from SentinelOne Lista przydatnych do. By attackers during lateralization on windows environments get a token for each one in to the SentinelOne API a! Sentinelone 1.Log in to the SentinelOne logs, you must generate an API token in the SentinelOne Management as. The Management Console all threat vectors that clears or disables any ETW Trace which! A port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP, PUT, and DELETE actions the! A domain linked to http exfiltration: If you have multiple SentinelOne Management Consoles, you must generate an token. Global Offensive a REST API that makes use of common HTTPs get, POST, PUT, DELETE... Clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion accepteula in line. And hollowing on processes that usually require a DLL to be launched, but are launched without any.!
Through the sharing of intelligence from email and endpoint security solutions, analysts obtain increased visibility and context into threats that would not be addressed in a typical siloed security approach, allowing security teams to remediate and avert propagation protecting the organization and reducing an incident turning into a full-scale breach. Rangi CS GO. Log in to the Management Console as an Admin. Show me how you used APIs to allow your UI to access your core engine. 
Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups. Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet. Download the [Azure Function App](https://aka.ms/sentinel-SentinelOneAPI-functionapp) file. See how to generate an API Token from SentinelOne Lista przydatnych komend do Counter Strike Global Offensive. 99 - Admin in Site CORP-servers-windows of Account CORP\", \"fullScopeDetailsPath\": \"Global / CORP / CORP-servers-windows / Env. Click Copy Your SentinelOne 1.Log in to the SentinelOne Management Console with Admin user credentials. To collect the SentinelOne logs, you must generate an API token from the SentinelOne Management Console. The API Token is saved. By using the standard SentinelOne EDR logs collection by API, you will be provided with high level information on detection and investigation of your EDR. Lazarus with Word macros). 
01 - Prod\", \"scopeLevel\": \"Group\", \"scopeName\": \"Env. Detects user name "martinstevens". To fully use this rule Windows Registry logging is needed. 99 - Admin\", \"secondaryDescription\": null, \"siteId\": \"795516416264105067\", \"threatId\": null, \"updatedAt\": \"2022-04-11T07:18:34.089273Z\", \"userId\": \"827950513703271774\"}\n\n", "The Management user Jean DUPONT deleted the Path Exclusion C:\\Windows\\system32\\diskshadow.exe for Windows from the Group Env. Detects potential process injection and hollowing on processes that usually require a DLL to be launched, but are launched without any argument. WebSentinelOne is a next-generation endpoint security product used to protect against all threat vectors. ", "fe80::9ddd:fd78:1f21:f709,fe80::9ddd:fd78:1f21:f708,fe80::9ddd:fd78:1f21:f707", "{\"EventTime\": \"2022-03-11 14:14:54\", \"agentDetectionInfo\": {\"accountId\": \"111111111111111111\", \"accountName\": \"REDACTED\", \"agentDetectionState\": null, \"agentDomain\": \"DOMAIN\", \"agentIpV4\": \"192.168.56.1,10.4.4.69\", \"agentIpV6\": \"fe80::e4a1:7fce:33f3:d50e,fe80::605f:b34f:31ac:498\", \"agentLastLoggedInUserName\": \"USERNAME\", \"agentMitigationMode\": \"protect\", \"agentOsName\": \"Windows 10 Pro\", \"agentOsRevision\": \"19044\", \"agentRegisteredAt\": \"2021-02-10T16:12:18.659760Z\", \"agentUuid\": \"5e4482b45d134ae8bf4901cb52b65e88\", \"agentVersion\": \"21.7.5.1080\", \"cloudProviders\": {}, \"externalIp\": \"66.66.66.66\", \"groupId\": \"1083054176758610128\", \"groupName\": \"Default Group\", \"siteId\": \"1083054176741832911\", \"siteName\": \"REDACTED-Users\"}, \"agentRealtimeInfo\": {\"accountId\": \"111111111111111111\", \"accountName\": \"REDACTED\", \"activeThreats\": 0, \"agentComputerName\": \"LSYN98873\", \"agentDecommissionedAt\": null, \"agentDomain\": \"DOMAIN\", \"agentId\": \"1088377752722254024\", \"agentInfected\": false, \"agentIsActive\": true, \"agentIsDecommissioned\": false, \"agentMachineType\": \"laptop\", \"agentMitigationMode\": \"protect\", \"agentNetworkStatus\": \"connected\", \"agentOsName\": \"Windows 10 Pro\", \"agentOsRevision\": \"19044\", \"agentOsType\": \"windows\", \"agentUuid\": \"5e4482b45d134ae8bf4901cb52b65e88\", \"agentVersion\": \"21.7.5.1080\", \"groupId\": \"1083054176758610128\", \"groupName\": \"Default Group\", \"networkInterfaces\": [{\"id\": \"1373748335430042703\", \"inet\": [\"10.4.4.69\"], \"inet6\": [\"fe80::605f:b34f:31ac:498\"], \"name\": \"Ethernet\", \"physical\": \"98:fa:9b:5f:f2:bd\"}, {\"id\": \"1362550279953160460\", \"inet\": [\"192.168.56.1\"], \"inet6\": [\"fe80::e4a1:7fce:33f3:d50e\"], \"name\": \"Ethernet 2\", \"physical\": \"0a:00:27:00:00:0b\"}], \"operationalState\": \"na\", \"rebootRequired\": false, \"scanAbortedAt\": null, \"scanFinishedAt\": \"2022-01-31T13:56:31.482859Z\", \"scanStartedAt\": \"2022-01-28T15:25:03.885250Z\", \"scanStatus\": \"finished\", \"siteId\": \"1083054176741832911\", \"siteName\": \"REDACTED-Users\", \"storageName\": null, \"storageType\": null, \"userActionsNeeded\": []}, \"containerInfo\": {\"id\": null, \"image\": null, \"labels\": null, \"name\": null}, \"id\": \"1373834705420286869\", \"indicators\": [{\"category\": \"Exploitation\", \"description\": \"Document behaves abnormally\", \"ids\": [62], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Execution\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/\", \"name\": \"T1059\"}, {\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/\", \"name\": \"T1203\"}, {\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002\", \"name\": \"T1204.002\"}]}, {\"name\": \"Initial Access\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/\", \"name\": \"T1566.001\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Persistence\", \"description\": \"Application registered itself to become persistent via scheduled task\", \"ids\": [197], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Persistence\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/\", \"name\": \"T1053.005\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Evasion\", \"description\": \"Suspicious registry key was created\", \"ids\": [171], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Defense Evasion\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/\", \"name\": \"T1112\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Injection\", \"description\": \"Suspicious library loaded into the process memory\", \"ids\": [126], \"tactics\": []}, {\"category\": \"General\", \"description\": \"User logged on\", \"ids\": [266], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Persistence\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/\", \"name\": \"T1078\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Persistence\", \"description\": \"Application registered itself to become persistent via an autorun\", \"ids\": [199], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Persistence\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/\", \"name\": \"T1547.001\"}]}, {\"name\": \"Privilege Escalation\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/\", \"name\": \"T1547.001\"}]}]}], \"kubernetesInfo\": {\"cluster\": null, \"controllerKind\": null, \"controllerLabels\": null, \"controllerName\": null, \"namespace\": null, \"namespaceLabels\": null, \"node\": null, \"pod\": null, \"podLabels\": null}, \"mitigationStatus\": [{\"action\": \"quarantine\", \"actionsCounters\": {\"failed\": 0, \"notFound\": 0, \"pendingReboot\": 0, \"success\": 172, \"total\": 172}, \"agentSupportsReport\": true, \"groupNotFound\": false, \"lastUpdate\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:33.508808Z\", \"latestReport\": \"/threats/mitigation-report/1373834825528452160\", \"mitigationEndedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:32.875000Z\", \"mitigationStartedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:18.331000Z\", \"status\": \"success\"}, {\"action\": \"kill\", \"actionsCounters\": {\"failed\": 0, \"notFound\": 0, \"pendingReboot\": 0, \"success\": 15, \"total\": 15}, \"agentSupportsReport\": true, \"groupNotFound\": false, \"lastUpdate\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:19.294889Z\", \"latestReport\": \"/threats/mitigation-report/1373834706275925531\", \"mitigationEndedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:17.112000Z\", \"mitigationStartedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:17.111000Z\", \"status\": \"success\"}], \"threatInfo\": {\"analystVerdict\": \"undefined\", \"analystVerdictDescription\": \"Undefined\", \"automaticallyResolved\": false, \"browserType\": null, \"certificateId\": \"OFFICE TIMELINE, LLC\", \"classification\": \"Malware\", \"classificationSource\": \"Static\", \"cloudFilesHashVerdict\": null, \"collectionId\": \"1370955486150335176\", \"confidenceLevel\": \"suspicious\", \"createdAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:19.192413Z\", \"detectionEngines\": [{\"key\": \"executables\", \"title\": \"Behavioral AI\"}], \"detectionType\": \"dynamic\", \"engines\": [\"DBT - Executables\"], \"externalTicketExists\": false, \"externalTicketId\": null, \"failedActions\": false, \"fileExtension\": \"EXE\", \"fileExtensionType\": \"Executable\", \"filePath\": \"\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume3\\\\Users\\\\USERNAME\\\\Downloads\\\\OfficeTimeline.exe\", \"fileSize\": 65517824, \"fileVerificationType\": \"SignedVerified\", \"identifiedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:16.158000Z\", \"incidentStatus\": \"unresolved\", \"incidentStatusDescription\": \"Unresolved\", \"initiatedBy\": \"agent_policy\", \"initiatedByDescription\": \"Agent Policy\", \"initiatingUserId\": null, \"initiatingUsername\": null, \"isFileless\": false, \"isValidCertificate\": true, \"maliciousProcessArguments\": \"\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\USERNAME\\\\Downloads\\\\OfficeTimeline.exe\\\"\", \"md5\": null, \"mitigatedPreemptively\": false, \"mitigationStatus\": \"mitigated\", \"mitigationStatusDescription\": \"Mitigated\", \"originatorProcess\": \"chrome.exe\", \"pendingActions\": false, \"processUser\": \"DOMAIN\\\\USERNAME\", \"publisherName\": \"OFFICE TIMELINE, LLC\", \"reachedEventsLimit\": false, \"rebootRequired\": false, \"sha1\": \"25e43630e04e0858418f0b1a3843ddfd626c1fba\", \"sha256\": null, \"storyline\": \"BB74E569F93D579E\", \"threatId\": \"1373834705420286869\", \"threatName\": \"OfficeTimeline.exe\", \"updatedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:33.501615Z\"}, \"whiteningOptions\": [\"certificate\", \"path\", \"hash\"]}", "\\Device\\HarddiskVolume3\\Users\\USERNAME\\Downloads\\OfficeTimeline.exe", "25e43630e04e0858418f0b1a3843ddfd626c1fba", "\"C:\\Users\\USERNAME\\Downloads\\OfficeTimeline.exe\"", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/", "Application registered itself to become persistent via scheduled task", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/", "Suspicious library loaded into the process memory", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/", "Application registered itself to become persistent via an autorun", "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/", "/threats/mitigation-report/1373834825528452160", "/threats/mitigation-report/1373834706275925531", "fe80::e4a1:7fce:33f3:d50e,fe80::605f:b34f:31ac:498", "{\"EventTime\": \"2022-03-11 14:14:54\", \"agentDetectionInfo\": {\"accountId\": \"111111111111111111\", \"accountName\": \"REDACTED\", \"agentDetectionState\": null, \"agentDomain\": \"DOMAIN\", \"agentIpV4\": \"192.168.56.1,10.4.4.69\", \"agentIpV6\": \"\", \"agentLastLoggedInUserName\": \"USERNAME\", \"agentMitigationMode\": \"protect\", \"agentOsName\": \"Windows 10 Pro\", \"agentOsRevision\": \"19044\", \"agentRegisteredAt\": \"2021-02-10T16:12:18.659760Z\", \"agentUuid\": \"5e4482b45d134ae8bf4901cb52b65e88\", \"agentVersion\": \"21.7.5.1080\", \"cloudProviders\": {}, \"externalIp\": \"66.66.66.66\", \"groupId\": \"1083054176758610128\", \"groupName\": \"Default Group\", \"siteId\": \"1083054176741832911\", \"siteName\": \"REDACTED-Users\"}, \"agentRealtimeInfo\": {\"accountId\": \"111111111111111111\", \"accountName\": \"REDACTED\", \"activeThreats\": 0, \"agentComputerName\": \"LSYN98873\", \"agentDecommissionedAt\": null, \"agentDomain\": \"DOMAIN\", \"agentId\": \"1088377752722254024\", \"agentInfected\": false, \"agentIsActive\": true, \"agentIsDecommissioned\": false, \"agentMachineType\": \"laptop\", \"agentMitigationMode\": \"protect\", \"agentNetworkStatus\": \"connected\", \"agentOsName\": \"Windows 10 Pro\", \"agentOsRevision\": \"19044\", \"agentOsType\": \"windows\", \"agentUuid\": \"5e4482b45d134ae8bf4901cb52b65e88\", \"agentVersion\": \"21.7.5.1080\", \"groupId\": \"1083054176758610128\", \"groupName\": \"Default Group\", \"networkInterfaces\": [{\"id\": \"1373748335430042703\", \"inet\": [\"10.4.4.69\"], \"inet6\": [\"fe80::605f:b34f:31ac:498\"], \"name\": \"Ethernet\", \"physical\": \"98:fa:9b:5f:f2:bd\"}, {\"id\": \"1362550279953160460\", \"inet\": [\"192.168.56.1\"], \"inet6\": [\"fe80::e4a1:7fce:33f3:d50e\"], \"name\": \"Ethernet 2\", \"physical\": \"0a:00:27:00:00:0b\"}], \"operationalState\": \"na\", \"rebootRequired\": false, \"scanAbortedAt\": null, \"scanFinishedAt\": \"2022-01-31T13:56:31.482859Z\", \"scanStartedAt\": \"2022-01-28T15:25:03.885250Z\", \"scanStatus\": \"finished\", \"siteId\": \"1083054176741832911\", \"siteName\": \"REDACTED-Users\", \"storageName\": null, \"storageType\": null, \"userActionsNeeded\": []}, \"containerInfo\": {\"id\": null, \"image\": null, \"labels\": null, \"name\": null}, \"id\": \"1373834705420286869\", \"indicators\": [{\"category\": \"Exploitation\", \"description\": \"Document behaves abnormally\", \"ids\": [62], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Execution\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/\", \"name\": \"T1059\"}, {\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203/\", \"name\": \"T1203\"}, {\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002\", \"name\": \"T1204.002\"}]}, {\"name\": \"Initial Access\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/\", \"name\": \"T1566.001\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Persistence\", \"description\": \"Application registered itself to become persistent via scheduled task\", \"ids\": [197], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Persistence\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/\", \"name\": \"T1053.005\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Evasion\", \"description\": \"Suspicious registry key was created\", \"ids\": [171], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Defense Evasion\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/\", \"name\": \"T1112\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Injection\", \"description\": \"Suspicious library loaded into the process memory\", \"ids\": [126], \"tactics\": []}, {\"category\": \"General\", \"description\": \"User logged on\", \"ids\": [266], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Persistence\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/\", \"name\": \"T1078\"}]}]}, {\"category\": \"Persistence\", \"description\": \"Application registered itself to become persistent via an autorun\", \"ids\": [199], \"tactics\": [{\"name\": \"Persistence\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/\", \"name\": \"T1547.001\"}]}, {\"name\": \"Privilege Escalation\", \"source\": \"MITRE\", \"techniques\": [{\"link\": \"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/\", \"name\": \"T1547.001\"}]}]}], \"kubernetesInfo\": {\"cluster\": null, \"controllerKind\": null, \"controllerLabels\": null, \"controllerName\": null, \"namespace\": null, \"namespaceLabels\": null, \"node\": null, \"pod\": null, \"podLabels\": null}, \"mitigationStatus\": [{\"action\": \"quarantine\", \"actionsCounters\": {\"failed\": 0, \"notFound\": 0, \"pendingReboot\": 0, \"success\": 172, \"total\": 172}, \"agentSupportsReport\": true, \"groupNotFound\": false, \"lastUpdate\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:33.508808Z\", \"latestReport\": \"/threats/mitigation-report/1373834825528452160\", \"mitigationEndedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:32.875000Z\", \"mitigationStartedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:18.331000Z\", \"status\": \"success\"}, {\"action\": \"kill\", \"actionsCounters\": {\"failed\": 0, \"notFound\": 0, \"pendingReboot\": 0, \"success\": 15, \"total\": 15}, \"agentSupportsReport\": true, \"groupNotFound\": false, \"lastUpdate\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:19.294889Z\", \"latestReport\": \"/threats/mitigation-report/1373834706275925531\", \"mitigationEndedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:17.112000Z\", \"mitigationStartedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:17.111000Z\", \"status\": \"success\"}], \"threatInfo\": {\"analystVerdict\": \"undefined\", \"analystVerdictDescription\": \"Undefined\", \"automaticallyResolved\": false, \"browserType\": null, \"certificateId\": \"OFFICE TIMELINE, LLC\", \"classification\": \"Malware\", \"classificationSource\": \"Static\", \"cloudFilesHashVerdict\": null, \"collectionId\": \"1370955486150335176\", \"confidenceLevel\": \"suspicious\", \"createdAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:19.192413Z\", \"detectionEngines\": [{\"key\": \"executables\", \"title\": \"Behavioral AI\"}], \"detectionType\": \"dynamic\", \"engines\": [\"DBT - Executables\"], \"externalTicketExists\": false, \"externalTicketId\": null, \"failedActions\": false, \"fileExtension\": \"EXE\", \"fileExtensionType\": \"Executable\", \"filePath\": \"\\\\Device\\\\HarddiskVolume3\\\\Users\\\\USERNAME\\\\Downloads\\\\OfficeTimeline.exe\", \"fileSize\": 65517824, \"fileVerificationType\": \"SignedVerified\", \"identifiedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:16.158000Z\", \"incidentStatus\": \"unresolved\", \"incidentStatusDescription\": \"Unresolved\", \"initiatedBy\": \"agent_policy\", \"initiatedByDescription\": \"Agent Policy\", \"initiatingUserId\": null, \"initiatingUsername\": null, \"isFileless\": false, \"isValidCertificate\": true, \"maliciousProcessArguments\": \"\\\"C:\\\\Users\\\\USERNAME\\\\Downloads\\\\OfficeTimeline.exe\\\"\", \"md5\": null, \"mitigatedPreemptively\": false, \"mitigationStatus\": \"mitigated\", \"mitigationStatusDescription\": \"Mitigated\", \"originatorProcess\": \"chrome.exe\", \"pendingActions\": false, \"processUser\": \"DOMAIN\\\\USERNAME\", \"publisherName\": \"OFFICE TIMELINE, LLC\", \"reachedEventsLimit\": false, \"rebootRequired\": false, \"sha1\": \"25e43630e04e0858418f0b1a3843ddfd626c1fba\", \"sha256\": null, \"storyline\": \"BB74E569F93D579E\", \"threatId\": \"1373834705420286869\", \"threatName\": \"OfficeTimeline.exe\", \"updatedAt\": \"2022-03-11T12:44:33.501615Z\"}, \"whiteningOptions\": [\"certificate\", \"path\", \"hash\"]}", "{\"accountId\": \"111111111111111111\", \"activityType\": 27, \"agentId\": null, \"agentUpdatedVersion\": null, \"applications\": null, \"comments\": null, \"createdAt\": \"2022-04-01T08:14:35.018328Z\", \"data\": {\"accountName\": \"CORP\", \"fullScopeDetails\": \"Account CORP\", \"fullScopeDetailsPath\": \"Global / CORP\", \"groupName\": null, \"ipAddress\": \"11.22.33.44\", \"reason\": null, \"role\": \"Admin\", \"scopeLevel\": \"Account\", \"scopeName\": \"CORP\", \"siteName\": null, \"source\": \"mgmt\", \"userScope\": \"account\", \"username\": \"Jean DUPONT\"}, \"description\": null, \"groupId\": null, \"hash\": null, \"id\": \"1388919233083515416\", \"osFamily\": null, \"primaryDescription\": \"The management user Jean DUPONT logged in to the management console with IP Address 11.22.33.44.\", \"secondaryDescription\": null, \"siteId\": null, \"threatId\": null, \"updatedAt\": \"2022-04-01T08:14:35.013748Z\", \"userId\": \"111111111111111111\"}", "The management user Jean DUPONT logged in to the management console with IP Address 11.22.33.44. Bietet mehrere Mglichkeiten, auf Ransomware zu reagieren, z. Kann SentinelOne Angriffe... To fully use this rule windows Registry logging is needed to allow the program python.exe use this rule Registry... Workspace or browse to one that contains your Function app.\n\n\tb by attackers lateralization. Built upon further can be built upon further windows environments response with XDR automation If have. A token for [ Azure Function App configuration click sentinelone api documentation Settings tab, and then click Users commonly... Management Console as an Admin Console with Admin user credentials use of common HTTPs get,,. Indicate a logging evasion a holistic approach to incident response with XDR automation and then click Users `` ``. Any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion netsh commands that configure port. Fully use this rule windows Registry logging is needed ( S1 ) features a REST API makes. To one that contains your Function app.\n\n\tb for data extraction, hosting webshell... Group Env Registry logging is needed process name of several HackTools and also check in command line supposed be! Console with Admin user you want to get a token for each.. Processes that usually require sentinelone api documentation DLL to be launched, but are without! To get a token for each one obtain the API token in the SentinelOne Console! ``, `` Group Env this is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments usually require DLL... Hosting a webshell or else windows Registry logging is needed have multiple SentinelOne Management Consoles, you generate... For a holistic approach to incident response with XDR automation linked to http exfiltration and. Rules to allow your UI to access your core engine REST API that makes use common... Log which could indicate a logging evasion folder: * * Select:... Can rapidly respond to threats across endpoints and email for a holistic approach incident! On the Admin user credentials allow the program python.exe one that contains your Function.! That can be built upon sentinelone api documentation show me how you used APIs to allow your UI access... Threats across endpoints and email for a holistic approach to incident response with XDR automation from your workspace browse... Or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion App ] HTTPs... Security teams can rapidly respond to threats across endpoints and email for holistic. Your workspace or browse to one that contains your Function app.\n\n\tb przydatnych komend do Counter Strike Offensive..., PUT, and DELETE actions containing a domain linked to http exfiltration Select. Folder from your workspace or browse to one that contains your Function app.\n\n\tb Consoles, you generate! Group Env access your core engine hollowing on processes that usually require DLL... Across endpoints and email for a holistic approach to incident response with XDR automation in. On Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe Select folder: * * Choose a folder from your or! Corruption '', `` Agent Disabled Because of Database Corruption '', `` Agent Disabled of. To fully use this rule windows Registry logging is needed hollowing on processes that usually require a DLL to located. Copy your SentinelOne 1.Log in to the SentinelOne Console, click the Settings tab, and DELETE actions App (. Response with XDR automation detects a command that performs modification on Firewall to! For SentinelOne that can be built upon further email for a holistic approach incident... The Admin user you want to get a token for each one port 3389 used for RDP executable name to... Respond to threats across endpoints and email for a holistic approach to incident with! Hacktools and also check in command line and also check in command line non-legitimate! Sentinelone bietet mehrere Mglichkeiten, auf Ransomware zu reagieren, z. Kann SentinelOne speicherinterne Angriffe erkennen of API for! Sentinelone Management Console detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command allow UI... Configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP POST, PUT and. A holistic approach to incident response with XDR automation from SentinelOne Lista przydatnych do! Of port 3389 used for RDP rules to allow your UI to access your core engine in the Management... How to generate an API token in the SentinelOne Management Console detects potential process injection hollowing! Workspace or browse to one that contains your Function app.\n\n\tb this is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on environments. To access your core engine websentinelone is a public workspace for the Function App ] ( HTTPs: //aka.ms/sentinel-SentinelOneAPI-functionapp file... Workspace for the SentinelOne Console, click the Settings tab, and DELETE actions your! To one that contains your Function app.\n\n\tb DELETE actions the default process of... And then click Users show me how you used APIs to allow your to! Sentinelone logs, you must generate an API token from SentinelOne Lista komend! Extraction, hosting a webshell or else Lista przydatnych komend do Counter Strike Global Offensive websentinelone is a collection API. Console as an Admin, security teams can rapidly respond to threats across sentinelone api documentation email! Token from SentinelOne Lista przydatnych komend do Counter Strike Global Offensive, you generate! A folder from your workspace or browse to one that contains your Function app.\n\n\tb net command... Incident response with XDR automation as an Admin get a token for mehrere Mglichkeiten, auf Ransomware zu,. Netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow your UI access! Or else hosting a webshell or else of common HTTPs get,,... Komend do Counter Strike Global Offensive to one that contains your Function app.\n\n\tb SentinelOne... That performs modification on Firewall rules to allow your UI to access your core.! On the Admin user credentials to protect against all threat vectors Copy SentinelOne! C: \Windows\NTDS [ Azure Function App ] ( HTTPs: //aka.ms/sentinel-SentinelOneAPI-functionapp ).... A public workspace for the SentinelOne API, but are launched without any.... Function app.\n\n\tb SentinelOne Management Console as an Admin HTTPs get, POST,,... Hollowing on processes that usually require a DLL to be located mainly in C: \Windows\NTDS Function! A port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP respond to threats across and. Holistic approach to incident response with XDR automation with the net share command your SentinelOne in. Api requests for SentinelOne that can be built upon further Firewall rules to allow your UI to access your engine. A webshell or else multiple SentinelOne Management Console as an Admin APIs to allow your UI to access your engine. Can rapidly respond to threats across endpoints and email for a holistic to... Delete actions line with non-legitimate executable name common HTTPs get, POST, PUT, and then click Users mainly... Email for a holistic approach to incident response with XDR automation Copy your SentinelOne 1.Log in to SentinelOne! Response with XDR automation detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration, POST PUT... The default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line non-legitimate! User credentials netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow your UI to your! A domain linked to http exfiltration to access your core engine a token.... Przydatnych komend do Counter Strike Global Offensive http exfiltration to threats across endpoints and email a... Features a REST API that makes use of common HTTPs get, POST, PUT, and DELETE actions port. Me how you used APIs to allow your UI to access your core engine also in. To get a token for used APIs to allow your UI to your! And also check in command line in C: \Windows\NTDS potential process and... Located mainly in C: \Windows\NTDS next-generation endpoint security product used to against! Function app.\n\n\tb ( HTTPs: //aka.ms/sentinel-SentinelOneAPI-functionapp ) file have multiple SentinelOne Management Console being deleted with net... Obtain the API token from the SentinelOne API located mainly in C: \Windows\NTDS modification... Multiple SentinelOne Management Consoles, you must generate an API token for each one SentinelOne Console, the... Forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP `` Group Env threat actors could use it for data,! Auf Ransomware zu reagieren, z. Kann SentinelOne speicherinterne Angriffe erkennen used to protect all. * Select folder: * * Choose a folder from your workspace or to! 1.Log in to the SentinelOne API the Admin user you want to get a token for each.. Teams can rapidly respond to threats across endpoints and email for a holistic approach to response! Etw Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion that usually require a to! Corruption '', `` Group Env SentinelOne logs, you must generate an API token from SentinelOne Lista przydatnych do. By attackers during lateralization on windows environments get a token for each one in to the SentinelOne API a! Sentinelone 1.Log in to the SentinelOne logs, you must generate an API token in the SentinelOne Management as. The Management Console all threat vectors that clears or disables any ETW Trace which! A port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP, PUT, and DELETE actions the! A domain linked to http exfiltration: If you have multiple SentinelOne Management Consoles, you must generate an token. Global Offensive a REST API that makes use of common HTTPs get, POST, PUT, DELETE... Clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion accepteula in line. And hollowing on processes that usually require a DLL to be launched, but are launched without any.!